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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, appellant 
in No. 97-7612, and CIGNA Corporation and Consolidated 
Subsidiaries ("the CIGNA Group"), appellants in No. 97- 
7619, appeal from the judgment of the United States Tax 
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Court upholding notices of deficiency issued against them 
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the amount of 
$62,176,665. For convenience, we will refer to the 
appellants collectively as "CIGNA." CIGNA complains that 
the Tax Court improperly deferred to the Commissioner's 
restrictive interpretation of the section of the Internal 
Revenue Code that limits the ability of affiliated insurance 
companies to file consolidated federal income tax returns. 
Because we conclude that the applicable Treasury 
regulation, as interpreted by the Commissioner, is a 
permissible interpretation of the statute, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Traditionally, life insurance companies ("life companies") 
have been profitable, whereas companies writing property 
or casualty insurance (P&C) have often been unprofitable. 
Nonlife insurance companies ("nonlife companies") have 
long been permitted to file consolidated federal income tax 
returns with their affiliated nonlife companies, but not with 
their affiliated life insurance companies. Life companies 
were required to file separate returns or returns 
consolidated with other affiliated life companies. 
 
The restrictions on life-nonlife consolidation were 
loosened when Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 
1976. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520. That Act modifies 
the Internal Revenue Code to permit life companies to file 
consolidated returns with nonlife companies, subject to 
certain exceptions (the "life-nonlife consolidation 
provisions"), for all taxable years beginning after December 
31, 1980. See 26 U.S.C. SS 1501, 1503-1504. At issue in 
this case is the interpretation of one of these statutory 
provisions, specifically the provision that limits certain 
setoffs between affiliated insurance companiesfiling 
consolidated returns. 
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A. 
 
The Statute 
 
Section 1501 grants affiliated groups the privilege of 
making consolidated returns with their affiliated 
companies. If the affiliated group contains both life and 
nonlife members, S 1504 requires that a company belong to 
the group for at least five years before it is treated as 
affiliated therewith. Section 1503 then limits the extent to 
which losses incurred by nonlife members may be set off 
against gains realized by life members. Subsection (c)(1), in 
particular, caps the amount of nonlife setoff at a percentage 
of either nonlife loss or life income, whichever is less. It 
states: 
 
       (1) In general--If . . . the consolidated taxable income 
       of the [nonlife members] results in a consolidated net 
       operating loss for such taxable year, then . . . the 
       amount of such loss which cannot be absorbed in the 
       applicable carryback periods against the taxable 
       income of such [nonlife members] shall be taken into 
       account in determining the consolidated taxable 
       income of the affiliated group for such taxable year to 
       the extent of 35 percent [30 percent in 1982] of such 
       loss or 35 [30 percent in 1982] percent of the taxable 
       income of the [life members], whichever is less. 
 
26 U.S.C. S 1503(c)(1). 
 
Subsection 1503(c)(2), the provision at issue here, further 
limits a group's ability to set nonlife losses off against life 
profits, providing: "Notwithstanding the provisions of 
paragraph [1503(c)(1)], a net operating loss for a taxable 
year of a [nonlife member of the group] shall not be taken 
into account in determining the taxable income of a [life 
member of the group] . . . if such taxable year precedes the 
sixth taxable year such members have been members of the 
same affiliated group . . . ." (emphasis added). Resolution of 
the instant dispute requires us to determine the scope of 
this latter limitation. 
 
                                4 
  
B. 
 
The Acquisitions 
 
The facts of this case are not in dispute. See  First 
Stipulation of Facts, App. at 71-88; Second Stipulation of 
Facts, App. at 89-104. On March 30, 1982, Connecticut 
General Corporation (Connecticut General), was the 
common parent of more than forty affiliated subsidiaries 
(the CG Group), one of which was a life company, 
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company (CGL). The 
CG Group met the definition of an affiliated group under 
S 1504 and had filed a consolidated tax return following the 
Code revision. Thereby, the CG Group was able to offset 
some of CGL's income with a portion of the CG Group's 
nonlife loss. App. at 75-76. 
 
At that time, INA Corporation (INA) was parent to over 
160 affiliated nonlife subsidiaries (the INA Group), which 
subsidiaries met the requirements of S 1504 and filed 
consolidated returns under S 1501. The INA Group's 
strength was in property and casualty insurance, while the 
CG Group's strength was in the areas of life, health and 
annuity, and personal and commercial property insurance. 
App. at 75-78. 
 
The following day, March 31, 1982, Connecticut General 
and INA (the two parent companies) merged to form a new 
company, CIGNA Corporation (CIGNA Corp.). The merger 
was a "reverse acquisition" within the meaning of 26 C.F.R. 
S 1.1502-75(d)(3), pursuant to which CIGNA Corp. 
succeeded Connecticut General as the common parent of 
the CG Group, which continued to exist for tax purposes. 
CIGNA Corp. also became the common parent of each of 
the former members of the INA Group, which group ceased 
to exist for tax purposes. App. at 73-74. Thus, in effect, the 
CG Group, which became the CIGNA Group, acquired the 
former INA subsidiaries individually. 
 
Subsequently, on November 20, 1984, a subsidiary of 
CIGNA Corp. acquired Preferred Health Care, Inc. (PHC). 
Like INA and Connecticut General before the merger, PHC 
was itself common parent to a group of affiliated 
corporations (the PHC Group) (all nonlife companies), which 
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qualified under S 1504 and filed consolidated returns under 
S 1501. All members of the PHC Group became members of 
the CIGNA Group upon acquisition and the PHC Group 
itself ceased to exist. App. at 75, 79-80. 
 
C. 
 
The Promulgation of Regulations 
 
On June 8, 1982, approximately two months after the 
Connecticut General/INA merger, the Commissioner, 
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. S 1502, promulgated proposed rules 
relating to the filing of life-nonlife consolidated returns. See 
Filing of Life-Nonlife Consolidated Returns, 47 Fed. Reg. 
24,737 (1982). The proposed regulations adopted a 
subgroup method for computing a life-nonlife group's 
consolidated taxable income. In effect, they treated the 
members of the group as two separate subgroups, with the 
life members as one subgroup and the nonlife members as 
another. Each subgroup was required to set off the gains 
and losses of members within that subgroup to determine 
whether the subgroup incurred a consolidated net 
operating loss (CNOL) or a gain. Only after the gains from 
within the nonlife subgroup were set off by losses from 
within that subgroup could such losses be used to reduce 
the life subgroup's income. 
 
The regulations further limited the portion of a nonlife 
subgroup's consolidated net operating loss (nonlife CNOL) 
that could be set off (up to the statutorily prescribed 
percentage) against net operating gains generated by the 
life subgroup: "The offsetable nonlife consolidated net 
operating loss that arises in any consolidated return year 
. . . is the [nonlife CNOL] reduced by the amount of the 
separate net operating loss . . . of any nonlife member that 
is ineligible in that year." Id. at 24,748 (to be codified at 26 
C.F.R. S 1.1502-47(m)(3)(vi)(A)) (emphasis added). The 
proposed rules thus distinguished between "eligible" 
companies -- those that had been members of the group for 
at least five years -- and "ineligible" companies -- those 
that had not been members for at least five years. 
 
                                6 
  
CIGNA wrote to the Commissioner on February 28, 1983, 
suggesting that proposed regulation S 1.1502-47(m)(3)(vi)(A) 
not be adopted with respect to acquired groups. CIGNA 
suggested instead that "separate nonlife members be 
treated as one entity if they are acquired in a single 
transaction by one group but were members of a different 
group prior to their acquisition." Letter from Kenneth W. 
Gideon, Chief Counsel, IRS, to Judith Soltz, Senior 
Counsel, CIGNA Corp. 1 (March 22, 1983), App. at 197. 
Under CIGNA's suggested approach, the losses of one 
ineligible acquired member would be used to offset the 
income of other ineligible acquired members, before the 
losses of eligible members were used for that purpose. The 
effect would be to increase the amount of eligible nonlife 
loss remaining after all nonlife gains had been offset, and 
thus to increase the nonlife offset the group could claim 
against life income. 
 
Final regulations had to be issued by March 14, 1983 to 
be effective for the 1982 taxable year. App. at 197; see also 
26 U.S.C. S 1503(a). The Commissioner did not adopt 
CIGNA's suggestion before issuing these regulations, but 
after the final regulations were issued, Kenneth W. Gideon, 
Chief Counsel to the IRS, sent CIGNA a letter, stating: 
"[The] final life-nonlife consolidated return regulations . . . 
do not adopt your suggestion but the preamble to the final 
regulation indicates that it will be given further study." 
App. at 197. Gideon also noted that "a lack of time [had] 
prevented a complete and thoughtful analysis of [CIGNA's] 
proposed solution." App. at 197-98. 
 
The final regulations and preamble did differ from the 
proposed regulations in three respects: (1) a new S 1.1502- 
47(m)(4) was added, which states in its entirety, "Acquired 
groups. [Reserved]"; (2) S 1.1502-47(m)(3)(vi)(A) was 
amended to note that its definition of ineligible NOL applies 
only "for purposes of . . . subparagraph (3)"; and (3) the 
preamble was amended to state: 
 
       [T]he Treasury Department will study further whether 
       it is appropriate to aggregate the income and losses of 
       ineligible members in certain cases. For instance, 
       notwithstanding the ordinary reading of section 
       1503(c)(2), it may be consistent with the intent of 
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       section 1503(c)(2), or correct as a matter of policy, to 
       aggregate the income and losses of ineligible members 
       that filed a consolidated return prior to their 
       acquisition by (and includibility in) another group that 
       files a consolidated return. 
 
Filing of Life-Nonlife Consolidated Returns, 48 Fed. Reg. 
11,436, 11,447-48, 11,440 (1983). 
 
D. 
 
CIGNA's Consolidated Returns 
 
In 1981, as soon as the Tax Reform Act of 1976 became 
effective, Connecticut General elected to take advantage of 
the opportunity the Act presented and treated CGL, its sole 
life insurance company affiliate, as an includible member of 
the CG Group, thereby setting off a portion of the CG 
Group's nonlife losses against CGL's income. For the years 
ending December 31, 1982 (which was after the INA 
acquisition) through December 31, 1985, CIGNA continued 
to file life-nonlife consolidated income tax returns. CGL, the 
only life company involved, had income throughout this 
period. The nonlife companies, which included, inter alia, 
those companies that were former members of the INA 
Group (for the 1982-85 returns) and the former members of 
the PHC Group (for the 1984-85 returns), had both income 
and loss. App. at 76, 80-81. 
 
CIGNA computed its taxable income as follows: 
 
       1. It consolidated (netted out) the income and los ses of 
       all nonlife companies to arrive at the consolidated net 
       operating loss or income. 
 
       2. It consolidated (netted out) the losses (all in eligible) 
       and income of the former INA group members to 
       calculate the net operating loss attributable to those 
       companies as a group. 
 
       3. It consolidated (netted out) the losses (all in eligible) 
       and income of the former PHC group members to 
       calculate the net operating loss attributable to those 
       companies as a group. 
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       4. It aggregated the operating losses of other non life 
       companies acquired within less than five years of the 
       return (and hence ineligible). 
 
       5. It added 2, 3, and 4 above to calculate the ine ligible 
       net operating loss. 
 
       6. It subtracted the ineligible net operating loss  from 1 
       above to calculate the eligible net operating loss. 
 
App. at 85-86. 
 
This treatment of the individual member companies of a 
former group as if they were a single company has been 
called the single entity method. Under CIGNA's approach, 
the losses of the former group members were reduced by 
the income of the members of that group, and that reduced 
loss was the figure treated as ineligible and deducted from 
the consolidated net operating loss of all the members of 
the CIGNA Group. 
 
As calculated by CIGNA, the acquisition of the INA Group 
had no effect on its tax liability, and the overall taxable 
income of the CIGNA Group (including the INA and PHC 
Groups) in the years 1982 through 1985 was equal to the 
sum of what would have been these three groups' separate 
taxable incomes had the groups not combined. See 
Appellants' Br. at 12, 20. 
 
E. 
 
The Commissioner's Audit 
 
On June 23, 1992, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
issued notices of deficiency to CGL for its taxable year 
ending December 31, 1980, and to CIGNA Group for its 
taxable years ending December 31, 1982 through December 
31, 1985. App. at 28-31, 45-53. 
 
Following the mode of analysis set forth in 26 C.F.R. 
S 1.1502-47(m)(3)(vi)(A), the Commissioner calculated 
CIGNA's ineligible loss in the following manner: 
 
       1. The income and losses of all nonlife companies were 
       consolidated (netted out) to arrive at the consolidated 
       net operating loss or income. 
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       2. The losses of each of the companies acquired wi thin 
       less than five years of the return were aggregated to 
       calculate the ineligible net operating loss. 
 
       3. The ineligible net operating loss was subtracte d 
       from the figure arrived at after the calculation in 1 
       above to calculate the eligible net operating loss. 
 
App. at 87. 
 
The Commissioner thus applied the separate entity 
method under which each of the former members of the INA 
and PHC Groups (all nonlife companies) was treated as a 
separate entity whose loss, if any, was subtracted from the 
consolidated net operating loss because the member was 
affiliated less than five years. Because each acquired 
company is treated as a separate entity, the fact that it was 
part of a group acquisition or that the group, prior to being 
acquired, had previously filed a consolidated return is not 
taken into account or relevant to its tax treatment after the 
acquisition. 
 
The contrasting methods made a substantial difference in 
the amount of net operating loss of the nonlife companies 
that could be taken into account in determining CIGNA's 
taxable income for 1982 through 1988. The following shows 
the result of the Commissioner's approach and that used 
by CIGNA in filing its returns with respect to the nonlife net 
operating loss eligible to reduce CGL's taxable income. 
 
Eligible Nonlife Net Operating Loss 
 
       Year CIGNA Commissioner 
       Calculation Calculation 
 
       1982 ($34,888,309)  ($10,225,979) 
       1983 ($28,810,677)  ($ 8,351,216) 
       1984 ($116,008,516) ($26,734,260) 
       1985 ($96,060,581)  ($94,424,416) 
 
(These numbers are undisputed and reflect the appropriate 
30% or 35% limitation set forth in S 1503(c)(1)). 
 
Thus, under the Commissioner's approach, because of 
the reduction in the eligible nonlife net operating loss, the 
CIGNA Group had $136,032,212 more consolidated taxable 
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income than under CIGNA's approach. App. at 42, 54. The 
Commissioner assessed the following deficiencies 
accordingly: 
 
       Petitioner             Year             Deficiency 
 
       CGL                    1980           $ 3,360,8731 
       CIGNA Group            1982            $15,080,878 
       CIGNA Group            1983           $  1,916,121 
       CIGNA Group            1984            $41,066,157 
       CIGNA Group            1985            $   752,636 
 
       Total Tax Deficiency (exclusive of interest and 
       penalties): $62,176,6652 
 
On September 21, 1992, the CIGNA Group and CGL 
petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of the 
deficiencies set forth in the Commissioner's Notices of 
Deficiency. App. at 23-31, 38-53. The cases were 
subsequently consolidated. On February 23, 1996 and 
February 26, 1996, respectively, the Commissioner and 
CIGNA filed motions for summary judgment before the Tax 
Court. App. at 57-66. That court found in favor of the 
Commissioner. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Commissioner, 109 T.C. 100 (1997). The CIGNA Group and 
CGL each filed a Notice of Appeal on November 21, 1997. 
App. at 2, 5. 
 
The sole issue before the Tax Court was the proper 
calculation of the offsetable consolidated net operating loss 
of recently acquired nonlife companies (INA and PHC) when 
the group by which they were acquired (ultimately CIGNA) 
files a life-nonlife consolidated return under the auspices of 
S 1503(c)(1) and (2). The Tax Court found that "under 
[CIGNA's] single entity method losses of the ineligible 
nonlife companies of the former INA and PHC Groups were, 
in effect, indirectly made available to reduce income of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The deficiency determined against CGL flows indirectly from the 
Commissioner's disallowance of a portion of the nonlife loss setoffs the 
CIGNA Group claimed on its returns. Resolution of CIGNA's claim 
regarding these setoffs will determine what, if any, deficiency is 
properly 
assessed against CGL. App. at 72-73. 
 
2. In CIGNA's appellate brief, it reported that interest on the deficiency 
was more than $150 million at that time. Appellants' Br. at 3. 
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[CGL], the life company." Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 109 
T.C. at 104. Because it also found the Commissioner's 
interpretation of the legislative regulations to be 
"sufficiently consistent with section 1503(c)(2) and its 
legislative purpose" to merit Chevron deference, see 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
467 U.S. 837 (1984), the court upheld the notices of 
deficiency. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 109 T.C. at 111- 
12. The Tax Court had jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. 
SS 6213(a), 6214(a) and 7442. We have jurisdiction to 
review that court's grant of summary judgment under 26 
U.S.C. S 7482. Our review is plenary. See Lerner v. 
Commissioner, 939 F.2d 44, 46 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
II. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
CIGNA contends that it was error for the Tax Court to 
uphold the deficiency assessments because the method 
CIGNA used in calculating its tax liability complied with all 
applicable laws and regulations. CIGNA's primary argument 
is that because none of the regulations adopted by the 
Commissioner in 1983 explicitly covers a group acquisition, 
it was free to follow any reasonable method to calculate the 
net operating loss of the members of the acquired INA and 
PHC Groups. See Gottesman & Co. v. Commissioner, 77 
T.C. 1149 (1981) (holding that, after Commissioner 
proposed two conflicting regulations but adopted neither, 
leaving no regulation in place, the taxpayer's choice of one 
of the proposals was reasonable and would be sustained). 
It disagrees with the Commissioner's position that 26 
C.F.R. S 1.1502-47(m)(3)(vi)(A) applies to acquired groups of 
nonlife companies, and it argues that the regulation is 
limited to acquisition of stand alone companies. As an 
alternative, CIGNA argues that if Regulation -47(m)(3)(vi)(A) 
is interpreted to govern the group acquisitions at issue, 
then that regulation is arbitrary, capricious, and therefore 
unenforceable. 
 
When Congress enacted the Internal Revenue Code 
revisions on consolidated returns, it gave the Secretary of 
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the Treasury broad authority to promulgate necessary 
regulations with respect thereto. See 26 U.S.C. S 1502. 
Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary promulgated the 
regulations at issue here, which are deemed legislative in 
character. See Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. Commissioner, 87 F.3d 
99, 104 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
Ordinarily, our review of an agency's construction of the 
statute it has been charged with executing is deferential. In 
Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 1994), we summarized 
our standard of review as follows: 
 
       When reviewing an agency's construction of a statute, 
       if the intent of Congress is clear, then we must give 
       effect to that intent. If the statute is silent or 
       ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, then a 
       deference standard applies, and the question for the 
       court becomes whether the agency's answer is based 
       on a reasonable construction of the statute. In 
       determining whether an agency's regulation complies 
       with its congressional mandate, we look to see whether 
       the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of 
       the statute, its origin, and its purpose. So long as the 
       regulation bears a fair relationship to the language of 
       the statute, reflects the views of those who sought its 
       enactment, and matches the purpose they articulated, 
       it will merit deference. 
 
Id. at 451-52 (citations omitted). 
 
To merit deference, an agency's interpretation of the 
statute must be supported by "regulations, rulings, or 
administrative practice." Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 
488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988). We will not defer to "an agency 
counsel's interpretation of a statute where the agency itself 
has articulated no position on the question." Id. 
 
Once an agency has adopted regulations interpreting the 
statute, the agency's consistent interpretation of its own 
regulation will also be accorded substantial deference. We 
"must defer to the [agency's] interpretation unless an 
`alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain 
language or by other indications of the [agency's] intent at 
the time of the regulation's promulgation.' " Thomas 
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) 
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(quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988)); 
accord Shell Oil Co. v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
 
Nonetheless, "[t]he responsibility to promulgate clear and 
unambiguous standards is upon the Secretary." Director, 
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, U.S. Dept. of 
Labor v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 54 F.3d 141, 147 
(3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus our 
deference to an agency's interpretation of its own 
regulations is "tempered by our duty to independently 
insure that the agency's interpretation comports with the 
language it has adopted." Director, Office of Workers' 
Compensation Programs, U.S. Dept. Of Labor v. Gardner, 
882 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
A. 
 
Whether an Applicable Regulation Has Been Adopted 
 
In order for CIGNA to prevail on its primary argument, it 
must convince us that no regulation governs the manner in 
which consolidated net operating loss of acquired groups 
must be treated. At the outset, CIGNA faces a major hurdle 
because the Commissioner concededly did promulgate a 
regulation, -47(m)(3), which deals with the treatment of 
acquired nonlife members. CIGNA concedes that Regulation 
-47(m)(3) governs the treatment of acquired stand-alone 
nonlife members, but it argues that it does not cover the 
treatment of "acquired groups" of nonlife members. As to 
those, CIGNA asserts, there was no regulation promulgated 
by the Commissioner, who instead reserved that question 
for another day under Regulation -47(m)(4). 
 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) interprets these 
regulations differently. It insists that Regulation -47(m)(3) 
applies to all ineligible nonlife companies, whether they are 
acquired individually or as part of a group. It interprets 
Regulation -47(m)(4) as doing no more than reserving a 
place in the Code of Federal Regulations for the 
Commissioner to insert a regulation requiring different 
treatment of acquired groups should the Commissioner 
later determine that such different treatment is appropriate. 
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CIGNA argues that, under Bowen, 488 U.S. at 212, the 
interpretation the Commissioner advances in this case is 
not entitled to deference because it is a "mere" litigating 
position. CIGNA's reliance on Bowen is misplaced. Bowen, 
which concerned the amount of deference due an 
administrative agency's informal interpretation of a statute, 
does not address what deference we should accord an 
agency's interpretation of its own regulations, such as is at 
issue here. Indeed, the Supreme Court has deferred to an 
agency's interpretation of its own regulations, even when 
that interpretation was proffered for the first time in 
litigation, see Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 
(1988), as have we, see Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for 
Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 183 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Thus, we will defer to the IRS's interpretation unless that 
"alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain 
language or by other indications of the [agency's] intent at 
the time of the regulation's promulgation." Gardebring, 485 
U.S. at 430. 
 
1. The Text of -47(m)(4) 
 
CIGNA insists that unless subsection 26 C.F.R. S 1.1502- 
47(m)(3)(vi) applies only to the acquisition of individual 
companies, the heading "Acquired groups" on -47(m)(4) 
would be without significance. CIGNA emphasizes the 
designation of "[Reserved]" on that regulation and points to 
various definitions which equate the terms "reserved" and 
"reserve" with notions of setting aside or apart and of 
deferring a determination. CIGNA then further claims that 
this interpretation of "reserved" accords with both the 
Commissioner's past administrative practice and the 
understanding of former high-ranking treasury officials. 
 
We are not convinced. We agree that use of the term 
"reserved" implies that something has been set aside. 
CIGNA, however, assumes that what was set aside was "the 
subject matter of the regulation" and further that the 
subject matter of the regulation was "the treatment of the 
loss of nonlife members acquired as a group." Appellant's 
Br. at 24. It is equally likely that what was set aside was 
the numerical subsection -47(m)(4) and the space in the 
regulation it demarcates. 
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CIGNA further attempts to establish that the 
"Commissioner's customary administrative practice[was to] 
interpret[ ] `reserved' in a regulation as a signal that there 
is no regulatory rule to govern the referenced subject 
matter" by identifying some instances in which the 
Commissioner used that term to have that meaning. 
Appellant's Br. at 24. That is not conclusive. In fact, the 
Office of the Federal Register, Document Drafting Handbook 
(1991), suggests a different use for the term "reserved." It 
describes "reserved" as "a term used to maintain the 
continuity of codification in the CFR" or "to indicate where 
future text will be added." Id. at 27. We find nothing in the 
precedent that CIGNA cites to preclude the Commissioner 
from using the term "reserved" in accordance with the 
Document Drafting Handbook, rather than to connote the 
absence of a substantive rule. 
 
Finally, we accord little weight to the 1996 recollections 
of the several Treasury officials who submitted affidavits 
regarding the meaning of the reserved clause for acquired 
groups. In the first place, the affidavits are inconsistent: 
William McKee states that "reserved" means that no 
regulation addresses the treatment of the reserved issue, 
App. at 226, but Andrew D. Pike understood that the 
general rule would continue to apply until a special rule 
was created for acquired groups, App. at 229. Moreover, 
reliance upon remembered details from officials who lacked 
the ultimate authority to issue any proposed regulation has 
little support in the law. See Armco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
87 T.C. 865, 867 (1987) ("[N]o one's personal views can be 
accepted as a pronouncement of the intended meaning of 
the regulation."); cf. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Board of 
Equalization, 480 U.S. 123, 131 n.* (1987) ("[The] attempt 
at the creation of legislative history through the post hoc 
statements of interested onlookers is entitled to no weight 
. . . ."). 
 
In sum, we, like the Tax Court, conclude that nothing in 
Regulation -47(m)(4) contradicts the Commissioner's 
interpretation of Regulation -47(m)(3)(vi) as applying to 
acquired groups. At most, Regulation -47(m)(4) is a"neutral 
factor." Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 109 T.C. at 109. 
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2. The Preamble 
 
CIGNA next contends that the preamble supports its view 
that there is no rule governing the acquisition of groups. 
We have stated that "the preamble to a regulation may be 
used as an aid in determining the meaning of a regulation." 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. United States Dept. of 
HHS, 101 F.3d 939, 944 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996). Here, the 
Preamble states, "[T]he Treasury Department will study 
further whether it is appropriate to aggregate the income 
and losses of ineligible members in certain cases. For 
instance, notwithstanding the ordinary reading of 
S 1503(c)(2), it may be consistent with the intent of 
S 1503(c)(2), or correct as a matter of policy, to aggregate 
the income and losses of ineligible members that filed a 
consolidated return prior to their acquisition by (and 
includibility in) another group that files a consolidated 
return." Filing of Life-Nonlife Consolidated Returns, 48 Fed. 
Reg. at 11,440. 
 
This passage does not contradict the IRS's interpretation 
of Regulation -47(m)(3)(vi) as applying to acquired groups. 
Indeed, it suggests that applying a rule other than that 
annunciated in -47(m)(3)(vi) would contradict "the ordinary 
reading of section 1503(c)(2)." The passage does suggest 
that it might be justifiable, nonetheless, to have such a 
rule, and it indicates that officials within the Treasury 
would consider adopting a different rule for acquired 
groups. Significantly, no such special rule was ever 
adopted. Under these circumstances, there is nothing 
unreasonable about the Commissioner's enforcement of the 
rule that did exist, a rule that, by its own terms, applies to 
these facts. 
 
Because the interpretation advanced by the IRS is neither 
inconsistent with any prior interpretation of these 
regulations nor incompatible with their plain text, we defer 
to that interpretation. We thus regard -47(m)(3) as 
applicable to acquired groups. 
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B. 
 
Whether the Regulation is Arbitrary, Capricious, 
and Unreasonable 
 
CIGNA's alternative argument is that the regulation, 
which is interpreted by the Commissioner to be applicable 
to treatment of acquired groups, is not entitled to deference 
because it is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. 
CIGNA concedes that we must defer to a regulation that is 
a reasonable implementation of the congressional mandate, 
but it argues that a regulation is only a reasonable 
statutory interpretation if it " `harmonizes with the statute's 
plain language, origin, and purpose.' " Appellants' Br. at 31- 
32 (citing National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 
440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)). Thus, we must review the 
legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 with an eye 
toward discerning the origin and purpose of the revision 
allowing life-nonlife consolidated tax returns. 
 
In the debates before Congress, it was suggested that 
lifting the ban on life-nonlife consolidated returns would 
help alleviate the acute shortage of insurance writing 
capacity in the property and casualty industry. See, e.g., 
122 Cong. Rec. 24,683 (statement of Sen. Ribicoff), 24,687 
(statement of Sen. Curtis); S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 456, 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3882. The Senate 
Report noted that P&C companies affiliated with other 
nonlife companies had long been permitted to file 
consolidated returns whereas P&C companies that 
happened to be affiliated with life companies had not been 
able to do so. See S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 454, reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3881. The Report states: "[T]he 
present ban on life-nonlife consolidations has been a 
hardship for casualty companies which are affiliated with 
life companies," and explains that "[t]he committee 
amendment deals with this problem." Id. 
 
At the same time, the legislators recognized that the 
then-existing ban on consolidated returns had assured that 
life insurance companies paid tax at the regular rate on an 
amount approximately equal to their taxable investment 
income. They sought to retain that result in drafting the 
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new life-nonlife provisions, presumably by limiting the 
permissible offset to a percentage of life income 
incorporated in S 1503(c)(1). See id.; Staff of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1976 (H.R. 10612, 94th Congress, Public Law 
94-455) at 435-36 (1976) ("[C]ongress adopted a provision 
which preserves the concept that some tax be paid with 
respect to the life insurance company's investment income 
. . . but which at the same time provides substantial relief 
in the future for casualty companies with losses.").3 
 
Shortly before the bill was enacted, the Conference 
Committee added S 1503(c)(2), the section at the center of 
the CIGNA-IRS dispute. That section provides that the net 
operating loss of a member of the group of affiliated 
companies "shall not be taken into account" unless that 
member has been a member of that group for five years. 
The Conference Report does not suggest a reason for this 
amendment. The slim legislative history reveals merely that, 
during the hearings relating to the life-nonlife consolidation 
provisions, Senator Kennedy in particular had expressed 
some concern that the largest life insurance companies 
might seek to enlarge the tax benefit provided by the new 
provisions by acquiring small loss-ridden P&C companies 
for the purposes of generating nonlife losses and setting 
these losses off against their taxable income. See id. at 
24,685 ("Those [life insurance companies] who have 
substantial profits can go out and purchase other 
companies with tax losses in order to be able to write these 
losses off."). Section 1503(c)(2), as enacted, thus appears to 
have been designed to discourage tax-motivated 
acquisitions by insurance companies. 
 
CIGNA argues that the Commissioner's approach runs 
counter to the origins and purposes of the Tax Reform Act 
of 1976 "because it exacerbates the very problem that 
Congress sought to address by enacting the life-nonlife 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Senate Report estimated that these provisions would "result in a 
decrease in revenues of $25 million in the fiscal year 1978, $55 million 
in the fiscal year 1979, $49 million in the fiscal year 1980, and $40 
million in the fiscal year 1981." S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 457, reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3884. 
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consolidation provisions." Appellants' Br. at 31. CIGNA 
notes that although, collectively, the former INA Group 
members suffered net losses in each of the four years 
following their acquisition, under the Commissioner's 
calculation the combined group's taxable income increased 
by $136 million and its tax liability increased by 
approximately $60 million over the same four-year period, 
thereby reducing the group's capacity to write insurance. 
CIGNA characterizes the Commissioner's interpretation of 
Regulation -47(m)(3)(vi) as thus "penaliz[ing] the P&C 
industry contrary to the purpose of the life-nonlife 
consolidation provisions." Appellants' Br. at 33. 
 
CIGNA's assessment of the congressional purpose is 
overly narrow. Congress did have an interest in increasing 
the capacity of the industry to write P&C insurance, which 
it effected through S 1501, which enables P&C companies to 
offset (partially) their losses against the income of their life 
affiliates by filing consolidated returns. Nothing in the 
regulations promulgated by the Commissioner prevented 
the former CG Group from taking full advantage of this 
opportunity by filing a consolidated tax return for its 
affiliated companies and offsetting the P&C losses against 
life income, which it did beginning in 1981. 
 
But, Congress apparently also had another subsidiary 
goal -- to limit tax-induced shopping for acquisitions. And 
when the former CG Group chose, within a year of the 
statute's effective date, to affiliate with the INA Group to 
form CIGNA, it ran into S 1503, the section Congress 
enacted to effectuate that subsidiary goal. Although CIGNA 
could continue to have the advantage of offsetting P&C 
losses within its historic group after the acquisition, it 
could not take advantage in any way of the losses of the 
INA Group. And CIGNA's protests notwithstanding, that is 
precisely what it seeks to do. 
 
If none of the INA companies had income, S 1503 would 
be irrelevant, as the methods proffered by both CIGNA and 
the Commissioner would arrive at the same result; the 
same is true if all of the INA companies had income, as 
their income would be added to the income of the other 
affiliated companies. However, CIGNA proposes to permit 
the INA companies to offset income within the group by 
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losses within the group before that income is added to that 
of the other now affiliated companies. In terms that may be 
too simplistic for the hundreds of millions of dollars at 
issue, this reduces the amount of income that could be 
added to the total CIGNA income. As the Commissioner 
explains, the net operating loss of a company that has not 
been a member of the group for five years is thus being 
"taken into account" by reducing the total income. 
 
Perhaps recognizing that S 1503 serves a goal other than 
that of increasing P&C capacity, CIGNA describes the 
purpose of that section narrowly: "Section 1503(c)(2) had a 
narrow[ ], targeted purpose, and was intended only to 
address the specific concern that life companies might have 
a tax incentive to acquire nonlife companies to take 
advantage of additional future loss offset benefits." 
Appellants' Br. at 36. CIGNA insists that S 1503(c)(2) "was 
intended only to limit the incremental consolidation benefit 
that might be derived from the acquisition of additional 
nonlife companies." Id. It then argues that the 
Commissioner's approach contradicts the statute by 
denying CIGNA more than this incremental benefit. 
 
CIGNA points to nothing in the scant legislative history of 
this provision that compels such a narrow reading of 
S 1503(c)(2)'s purpose. Moreover, the statute contains no 
language that limits its effect to the denial of the 
incremental consolidation benefit. It says nothing more 
than that losses of companies that affiliated with the group 
less than five years ago shall not be taken into account. 
 
CIGNA's argument that the Commissioner has 
interpreted S 1503(c)(2) too broadly focuses too narrowly on 
the short-term. Section 1503 only limits offsets forfive 
years following an acquisition. After that time, group 
insurance companies such as CIGNA can offset the losses 
of acquired companies as permitted, thereby effecting an 
increase in P&C capacity. There is no indication that 
Congress focused, in the final stages of enactment of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1976, on the situation of group 
companies acquiring group companies. Even if it had, there 
is even less reason to think that it would have been swayed 
by the potential short-term disadvantage to some 
companies. More likely is that Congress was interested in 
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the long-run solution. After all, it was Congress that 
imposed the five-year limitation in the first place. 
 
Finally, CIGNA makes a policy argument that the INA 
companies should be permitted to offset losses against 
income because they had been permitted to do so before 
the acquisition. It contends that the Commissioner's 
regulation, as interpreted, is unfair because it requires that 
the income of profitable members of the acquired group be 
taken into account, but not the loss of acquired members. 
The simple answer, obviously unsatisfactory to CIGNA, is 
that the Commissioner, who has the delegated authority to 
promulgate legislative regulations, did not provide for initial 
offsets within the group. And there is no language in the 
statute that requires the offset CIGNA seeks. In fact, there 
was disagreement within the IRS as to whether the 
Commissioner could have provided for such initial offsets 
without contradicting the statute. Before us, the IRS 
continues to characterize that question as arguable. 
Inasmuch as the Commissioner did not adopt CIGNA's 
approach, the issue is not before us and we make no 
comment. 
 
We do note, however, that if CIGNA's approach were 
adopted, it would create a distinction between nonlife 
companies acquired as a group and those very same 
companies acquired individually that is hard to justify. Had 
CIGNA acquired only INA's profitable nonlife companies in 
1981, there is no question that the acquisition would have 
increased its overall taxable income. And, as CIGNA 
presumably concedes, had CIGNA subsequently acquired 
the remainder of the INA Group, S 1503(c)(2) would have 
precluded offsetting that increase in taxable income with 
the losses of the later-acquired members. CIGNA has 
offered no justification for requiring the Commissioner to 
treat the instant case differently, merely because both 
acquisitions occurred on the same day. 
 
The overriding determinant is that the Commissioner's 
regulation is authorized by the statute, and his 
interpretation of that regulation is not so unreasonable as 
to be declared invalid by this court on policy grounds. That 
is not our function or our decision. As the Supreme Court 
has emphasized, "[w]hen Congress . . . has delegated 
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policymaking authority to an administrative agency, the 
extent of judicial review of the agency's policy 
determinations is limited." Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 
501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991). 
 
III. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth, we agree with the Tax Court, 
and will affirm its judgment. 
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